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Modernization Mixed with Nationalism
Abstract: This essay reflects on a particular manner in which modernisation have taken 
place in the Balkans in modern history, from the 1878 Berlin Congress onwards. 
The Balkan countries faced twofold difficulties in their development: they had to 
overcome their backwardness stemming from the centuries of the Ottoman yoke and 
catch up with modern Western Europe, and resolve their numerous mutual territo-
rial and political disputes. The latter task was especially difficult due to the constant 
interference in Balkan affairs on the part of Great Powers. This interference further 
aggravated nationalistic tensions between the Balkan states. The peculiar mixture of 
modernisation efforts and nationalism remains to this day when the entire region 
strives to join the European Union.
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It is rather difficult to find a region in Europe which has seen so many conflicts, redrawing of borders, ethnic and political changes as the Bal-
kans has. Plans for different re-arrangements of the Balkans have been even 
more numerous.1 That is hardly surprising: these occurrences were provoked 
by the proverbial Balkan fragmentation.
The conflict-prone nature of the Balkans was particularly conspicu-
ous during the nineteenth and early twentieth century when independent 
national states were formed and then tried to extend their borders in accor-
dance with what was very broadly-conceived as ethnic territory. Contrary 
to West Europe, the process of national delimitation has never been fully 
completed. 
Great Power interference with the relations in the Balkans played 
considerable role in facilitating national tensions. In fact, ethnic fragmenta-
tion and plethora of territorial disputes stemmed from such interference. 
The rival national programmes of Balkan states clashed one with another 
and, in parallel, had to overcome the centuries of backwardness. In the wake 
of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the majority of Balkan states regained 
their independence after a long period of time while Bulgaria was granted 
an autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire.
1 See more in Balkany v evropeĭskikh politicheskikh proektakh XIX–XXI vv, eds. Ritta 
P. Grishina, Konstantin V. Nikiforov & Galina V. Lobacheva (Moscow: Institut 
slavjanovedenija RAN, 2014). 
DOI: 10.2298/BALC1445443N
Original scholarly work
Balcanica XLV (2014)444
Figuratively speaking, these countries came back to Europe after 
having been taken into Asia following the Ottoman conquests. Nonethe-
less, it was not enough to make a formal come-back; it was necessary to 
return to Europe in a real sense of that word which meant to Europeanise 
all the aspects of a largely patriarchal way of life; it was necessary to turn the 
people into true Europeans in a socio-cultural sense of that word. Therefore, 
modernisation (or Europeanization) became an essential idea for the Bal-
kan states in the period from the Berlin Congress to the Great War. For the 
developing countries, there was no more actual or pressing task.  
The period from the 1878 Berlin Congress to the First World War in 
1914 was that of the so-called “first globalisation”. It seemed that new op-
portunities opened for the Balkan states. Yet, neither European nor Balkan 
states seized that chance. The Balkan countries became “poor cousins” of 
the Western world and, moreover, were threatened to become dependent 
again, but this time dependent on European states rather than the Otto-
man Empire. In case of Serbia, the danger came from Austria-Hungary. 
Incidentally, it was then that the Balkans was dubbed a “powder keg in 
Europe”. Instead of the expected era of prosperity, the world slipped into 
international conflict.
It can never be stressed enough that the history of Balkan nations 
in the real sense of that word started only after the Berlin Treaty. And it 
was compressed in thirty-six years — until the outbreak of the First World 
War. And the Balkan countries had a great deal of things to accomplish in 
the field of modernisation over those thirty-six years. This period is sharply 
divided in two phases: a relatively calm first phase which ended around the 
coup d’état in Serbia in 1903 or slightly afterwards and the second phase 
which led to the tumultuous war years.  
The decisions reached at the Berlin Congress remained in full force 
until the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, but some of its terms had been ques-
tioned much earlier. In 1885, Bulgaria was unified and then the Serbo-Bul-
garian war broke out. In 1896–1897, there was the uprising on the Island 
of Crete which escalated into the Greco-Ottoman war.2 In 1908, Austria-
Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus initiated yet another 
Great Power-induced redrawing of the Balkans. 
It has long been noted that the growing influence of Serbian officer 
corps, the increasing prestige of a military career and the partial militarisa-
tion of Serbian politics constituted an important feature of modernisation 
in Serbia. This aspect has always been actual and one of the most significant 
2 For more details see Olga V. Sokolovskaia, Velikiĭ ostrov Sredizemnomor'ia, Gretsiia 
i mirotvorcheskaia Evropa. 1897–1909 gg.: K 100-letiiu prisoedineniia Krita k Gretsii 
(Moskva: Institut slavjanovedenija RAN, 2013).
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for Serbian historiography. It was associated with the problem of the in-
complete social structure of Serbian society. In a certain phase of the coun-
try’s development senior officer corps tried to fill the void caused by the lack 
of a hereditary elite which had been annihilated in Serbia, and some other 
Balkan countries, after the Ottoman conquest. The sole exception in the 
Balkans in this respect was the “boyar Romania” due to its distance from 
Constantinople. Some Serbian historians present army officers as a substi-
tute to the “middle class” of Serbian society.3 
The result was that the army rather than state apparatus, clerks, po-
litical parties and partially intelligentsia became one of the pillars of, and at 
the same time a limited threat to, the Serbian democratic regime. This exag-
gerated role of Serbian officer corps persisted from 1903 until the Salonica 
trial in 1917 and the execution of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, the 
unofficial leader of the clandestine officer organisation “Black Hand”.
Nevertheless, Serbian officers continued to play a political role in 
their country’s history. This was the case with the royalist anti-fascist move-
ment of General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović in the Second World War, 
the attempts of the post-Titoist Yugoslav People’s Army ( JNA) leadership 
to prevent the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation in the early 1990s, and 
finally, the emergence of the special intelligence services on the political 
scene towards the end of Slobodan Milošević’s rule in the Federal republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
The increasing influence of the military in Serbia following the May 
1903 coup was not a random and isolated occurrence in the Balkans. In 
1908, the pan-Greek Military League was formed while at the same time 
the Young Turk revolution took place in the Ottoman Empire executed by 
junior officers. Therefore, militarisation was a regional process.4
The Serbian modernisation remains a matter of lively debate in both 
Serbian and Russian historiography. It centres on the extent of European-
ization, the extent to which Serbia was prepared to adopt European values. 
Occasionally, this discussion becomes rather strange when its participants 
persistently point out the obvious - they “knock at the open door”. It is 
crystal clear that Serbia was far from “a modern European state” at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century with regard to infrastructure and industri-
alisation. However, that cannot be a reason for criticising Serbian politicians 
3 Cf. Dušan T. Bataković, “La Main Noire (1911–1917): l’armée serbe entre démocratie 
et autoritarisme”, Revue d’histoire diplomatique, No 2, Paris 1998, 95–144.
4 Dimitrije Djordjević, “The Role of the Military in the Balkans in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury”, in Der Berliner Kongress von 1878. Die Politik der Grossmächte und die Probleme 
der Modernisierung in Südosteuropa in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, eds. Ralph 
Melville & Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1982), 317–347.
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because they embraced French-inspired doctrines (liberalism and radical-
ism), constitutional monarchy, parliamentary system and other European 
political institutions.5
The speed and extent of political reforms remain a matter of po-
lemics. The avoidance of reform implementation had grave consequences. 
The policy of Milan Obrenović serves as an ample illustration of this rule. 
However, the Balkan rulers often de facto carried out more consistent poli-
cy of modernisation than some of their predecessors. They often merged a 
policy of modernisation with nationalist slogans under which, in fact, the 
struggle against previous modernisation efforts started. It was important 
to give modernisation a form that was apprehensible and acceptable to the 
people at large. 
The period from the Berlin Congress to the First World War has 
lately been drawing a lot of attention. The books of Russian scholars A. L. 
Shemyakin, A. J. Timofejev, IA. V. Vishniakov, P. A. Iskenderov6 no doubt 
expanded our knowledge and understanding of the complex processes that 
took place in the Balkans in the early twentieth century.
Finally, the choice of a road to civilisation often in practice meant 
the choice between pro-western (in case of Serbia pro-Austrian) and pro-
Russian course. A. L. Pogodin has noted a remarkable contrast in the life of 
Serbs between “European taste of a few […] and the deep-rooted affection 
for Russia among the mass [of people]”.7 A similar situation exists even 
today.8
There was also a matter of Balkan territorial issues. Those have been 
resolved in various manners but mostly in a traditional way — by war. It is 
sufficient to observe that the twentieth century saw the two Balkan Wars, 
5 More on French influence in pre-1914 Serbia: Dušan T. Bataković, Les sources françai-
ses de la démocratie serbe: 1804–1914 (Paris: CNRS, 2013).
6 Russkie o Serbii i serbah. T. I. Pis'ma, stat'i, memuary, ed. Andrej L. Shemjakin (Saint 
Petersburg: Aletejja, 2006); Russkie o Serbii i serbah. T. II. Arhivnye svidetel'stva, ed. 
Andrej L. Shemjakin (Moscow: Indrik, 2014); Aleksandr Ĭ. Timofeev, Krest, kinzhal 
i kniga. Staraja Serbija v politike Belgrada 1878–1912 gg (Saint Petersburg: Aletejja, 
2007); Jaroslav V. Vishnjakov, Voennyj faktor i gosudarstvennoe razvitie Serbii nachala XX 
veka (Moscow: MGIMO-Universitet, 2012); Petr A. Iskenderov, Serbiia, Chernogoriia i 
albanskiĭ vopros v nachale XX veka (Saint Petersburg: Aletejja, 2013).
7 Aleksandr L. Pogodin, Istorija Serbii i Chernogorii, Bosnija, Gercegovina, Makedonija, 
Slovenija, Horvatija (Moscow: Monolit-Evrolinc-Tradicija, 2002), 205.
8 Dejan Mirović, Zapad ili Rusija (Belgrade: IGAM, 2004); Srbi o Rusiji i Rusima. Od 
Elizavete Petrovne do Vladimira Putina (1750–2010). Antologija, ed. Miroslav Jovanović 
(Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, Institut za teološka istraživanja & Institut 
za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011).
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two World Wars and a series of civil wars during the 1990s often referred to 
as the Wars of the Yugoslav succession.
The Balkan Wars, the first one in particular, had a special place in the 
re-arrangement of South-East Europe. It was something of an East-Eu-
ropean Reconquista which pushed the Ottoman Empire and Muslim and 
Ottoman population back to Asia. The small Balkan states made a common 
stand on their own volition for the first time in history rather than acting in 
support of Great Powers agenda. The Balkan allies were even termed “the 
seventh Great Power”. Their alliance, however, did not last for long. The 
division of spoils ended in new conflicts. Just like the struggle against the 
Moors did not spare the Christian kingdoms from fighting each other, the 
expulsion of the Ottomans was accompanied by conflicts between the new 
Balkan states over the former Ottoman possessions.9
The Balkan Wars “constituted chronologically the second, but equally 
important, phase of establishing the Balkan national states” — the Berlin 
Congress of 1878 being the first phase.10 The Eastern Question which had 
been on the European agenda from the end of the seventeenth century 
— the complex knot of international conflicts over the territories of the 
declining Ottoman Empire - was also brought to a close. Imperial Russia 
remained deprived of the ardently desired “keys of its own house”, the con-
trol over the Black Sea bays and Constantinople. 
The demise of the multinational Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian 
Empire after the First World War led to formation of new national states 
instead of them, a consequence of then modern slogan of national self-
determination. However, the Versailles peace settlement based on that 
principle did not extinguish a multitude of national disputes. The newly-
established borders did eliminate a lot of the old disagreements, but they 
also gave birth to new ones. Moreover, all the Balkan states had their own 
dissatisfied minorities.
Nearly all the Balkan countries faced national disasters in the early 
twentieth century. The Ottomans lost their European lands and then their 
Empire collapsed. Bulgaria was bitterly disappointed twice — after the Sec-
ond Balkan and the First World War. Serbia lost her outlet to the sea in 
1913 and survived her own Calvary during the First World War. Macedonia 
remained divided. In the wake of the First World War, Greece suffered “Asia 
9 V “porohovom pogrebe Evropy”. 1878–1914, ed.Vladilen N. Vinogradov (Moscow: 
Indrik, 2003).
10 Artem A. Ulunjan, “Opyt nevrazhdebnogo istoriopisanija: Balkanskie vojny v 
kontekste “novoj istoriografii regiona”, in: Modernizacija vs vojna. Chelovek na Balkanah 
nakanune i vo vremja Balkanskih vojn (1912–1913), eds. Ritta P. Grishina & Andrej L. 
Shemjakin (Moscow: Institut slavjanovedenija RAN, 2012), 48.
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Minor disaster”, the defeat of the Greek army in the Greco-Turkish War 
(1919–1921). The sole exception was the Carpatho-Balkanic Romania. 
Following the Second World War, there was a rising interest in dif-
ferent forms of a union between the Balkan countries. In particular, one of 
the most famous projects for the re-arrangement of South-East Europe was 
the plan to form the so-called Balkan (Danube) federation.11 Its realisa-
tion never got off the ground. In the Balkans, and across the entire Eastern 
Europe, the states became even more monolith in terms of their ethnic 
composition. 
As a result of the expulsion at the end of the Second World War, the 
ten million strong German community in Eastern Europe ceased to ex-
ist. The instrumentalisation of German national minorities abroad for the 
purpose of disrupting the countries in which they lived on the part of Nazi 
Germany undermined the general position of national minorities in the 
long run. The world directed its attention to protection of individual hu-
man rights. The protection of universal human rights was considered suf-
ficient for the protection of all, national minorities and small ethnic groups 
included. 
In the 1990s, when the Yugoslav crisis erupted, it became obvious 
that this was not the case: the collective rights of ethnic groups separated 
from the main body of their nation were also in need of protection. Inciden-
tally, the break-up of communist Yugoslavia turned into another Serbian 
national disaster.
From the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century the solution of 
Balkan territorial and national disputes was often envisaged in the forma-
tion of larger multinational states which would digest not just different na-
tions, but also their territorial conflicts. Yugoslavia was the best example of 
that whereas numerous schemes for Balkan (Danube) federation were never 
realised. The end of the twentieth century witnessed the diametrical opposi-
tion to such tendency. In order to resolve national conflicts in multinational 
states, these states were disintegrated.
The problems of Balkan modernisation did not disappear following 
the two World Wars. After the Great War, modernisation was still modelled 
on the western patterns and it continued to lag behind with the result that 
the gap separating the Balkan from developed countries did not decrease. 
After the Second World War all the states (with the exception of Greece) 
underwent the cantering, and now alternative, modernisation which trod 
on the path of socialism. Yugoslavia endeavoured to find another model of 
11 Cf more in: The Balkans in the Cold War: Balkan Federations, Cominform, Yugoslav-
Soviet Conflict, ed. Vojislav G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian 
academy of Sciences and Arts, 2012).
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an alternative modernisation through the so-called self-management. And 
once again, the initial success turned into failure at the end of the road. 
Besides, that failure was followed by the rise of nationalism in all Balkan 
countries and, in fact, nationalism became an alternative to communism. 
Today the Balkan countries again undergo an imitating and cantering mod-
ernisation. 
It is important to remind oneself of the cyclicality of Serbian (Yu-
goslav) history. It was particularly visible in the attempts to solve the most 
complex national question in the Balkans. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it 
could be safely said, tried to apply all the variations of internal policy, from 
unitary state to federalism in 1939 when the Croatian lands (two previous 
banovinas) formed the Banovina of Croatia. Seeking its own solution of 
the national question, “the second”, Tito’s communist Yugoslavia traversed 
much the same path as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia — from formally fed-
eral, but essentially unitary, state composition on the pattern of that in the 
Soviet Union to de facto confederal one as defined in the 1974 Constitution. 
And the outcome was much the same.  
 The main characteristic of Yugoslavia’s self-management reforms 
was the fact that it coupled economy and ethnic relations. One affected the 
other and sometimes accelerated and other times slowed down the overall 
pace of reforms. Relative democratisation of social life cleared the ground 
for economic development. However, it produced entirely different results 
in the field of ethnic relations since it was primarily understood as a decen-
tralisation of the state and loosening of federal ties. Rather than harmon-
ising ethnic relations decentralisation brought about growing nationalism 
in all the Yugoslav federal units (republics) and all spheres of public life, 
and increasing tensions between the Yugoslav nations. When those tensions 
reached their zenith, Yugoslavia broke up.12
Today nearly all Balkan countries belong to or endeavour to join the 
European Union (to “come back to Europe” again). This is again facilitated 
by the globalising world. Nevertheless, the European project has not put an 
end to numerous Balkan disputes. To say the least, the Serbian, Macedonian 
and Albanian national questions remain unsolved. Some old differences like 
the Greco-Turkish one have not been removed either. The unifying Euro-
Atlantic idea in the Balkans is challenged by some other ideas as, for ex-
ample, the pan-Slav, which is currently not in the forefront, or, contrary to 
it and growing in strength, the pan-Turkish one (as part of the more global 
pan-Islamic idea). 
12 IUgoslaviia v XX veke. Ocherki politicheskoĭ istorii, ed. Konstantin V. Nikiforov 
(Moscow: Indrik, 2011).
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The Balkans remains to be a volatile and rather under-developed re-
gion of Europe. The Balkans population suffer the most on that account. 
The accomplishment of their dream of a peaceful and comfortable life 
seems not to lay in a new, if voluntary, submission to “European Empire” 
this time, but rather in the realisation of a still actual slogan “Balkan for the 
Balkan peoples”. At the moment, this appears somewhat utopian, but who 
knows what tomorrow will hold in store? The Balkan history continues no 
matter what.
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